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Abstract: The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) sets the standard in revenue 
transparency in 46 countries and works under the assumption that compliance with the initiative will 
improve transparency and curb corruption in member states. However, individual case studies raise 
doubts about the success of the initiative. Building upon the literatures on compliance and 
governance, this paper analyzes the impact of EITI membership on transparency and corruption 
levels between 2006 and 2013. By using interrupted time series and panel data analyses, this 
research makes an original contribution to show that affiliation with the EITI immediately improved 
overall aggregate data disclosure in member countries in this period. At the same time, the paper 
also shows that perceptions of corruption did not change. This outcome questions the effectiveness 
of promoting only a narrow definition of transparency in extractive industries as a measure to 
prevent corruption. The results imply that a more comprehensive treatment of transparency might be 
necessary; specifically to distinguish regimes that use transparency reforms for public relations 
purposes as opposed to genuine reformers.  
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1. Introduction  
 
In the last decade transparency has become a global phenomenon. Now, even countries 
with questionable records of good governance seek compliance with global transparency 
norms. This trend is especially evident in the extractive industries; where international 
financial institutions (IFIs) promote transparency in order to help countries better manage 
their resources. In particular, the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), 
currently implemented in 46 countries, sets the standard in revenue transparency. The 
main assumption of the EITI process is that compliance with the initiative will improve 
transparency and curb corruption in member states. However, individual case studies 
raise doubts about the overall success of the initiative especially with regards to battling 
corruption. Does the EITI process actually help improve transparency and curb 
corruption?  
This research addresses this question by focusing on the effectiveness of 
transparency promotion. It analyzes the impact of EITI membership on transparency and 
 corruption levels between 2006 and 2013 by using interrupted time series and panel data 
analyses. It makes an original contribution to the literatures on governance and 
compliance to show that affiliation with the EITI improved overall economic 
transparency in member countries in this period. At the same time, the paper also shows 
that the EITI membership did not have a visible impact on perceptions of corruption. I 
argue that this outcome is mostly due to the narrow definition of transparency adopted by 
the EITI before 2013, which failed to address corruption in the broader resource 
management process and the economy as a whole. As a result, even if many EITI 
members successfully complied with the EITI standard, major corruption networks 
remained intact.  
The first section of the paper analyzes the link between transparency and 
corruption in the extractive industries. The next section examines the EITI as the most 
significant external agent of transparency promotion. The following sections introduce 
the analytical framework, the model, and the results. The last part of the paper discusses 
the implications of the results for resource-rich countries.  
2.  Is Transparency a Remedy for Corruption? 
 
One of the main impacts of natural resource abundance is the creation of excess revenues 
above normal profits, or rents. In many developing countries, this process may encourage 
shortsightedness and rent-seeking behavior by the politicians, which weakens the state 
capacity. These rentier states often fail to function as a ‘state’ in the conventional sense of 
providing security, well being, and identity to its citizens in exchange for taxes and 
certain national services. They instead show many symptoms of underdevelopment such 
 as corruption, lack of rule of law, and dysfunctional bureaucracies (Beblawi, 1987; 
Mahdavy, 1970; Mehlum, Moene, & Torvik, 2008). As a consequence, in many resource-
exporting countries, rulers fail to address problems of economic development, income 
inequality, regional disparities, health care, and education despite high revenues from 
extractive industries.  
The literature on good governance argues that well-functioning institutions can 
offset these predatory development policies and reduce patronage and corruption in 
resource-rich countries (Mehlum, Moene, & Torvik, 2006). This institutional focus on the 
implications of resource dependency primarily relates to democratization. This 
perspective may suggest that as resource-rich countries become more democratic, 
corruption will cease to be a major problem. However, the experience of many 
authoritarian oil states in the Gulf reveals that, despite the claims of the modernization 
theory (Dahl, 1971; Huntington, 1993; Lipset, 1959), democratization is not an automatic 
process. Indeed, oil wealth may actually adversely affect democracy (Jensen & 
Wantchekon, 2004; Korhonen, 2004) and lengthen authoritarian regimes (Ross, 2001, 
2008). Furthermore, political leaders of many authoritarian resource-rich countries 
zealously block any political openings (Deese, 2003).  
In the last decade, transparency emerged as a popular catchphrase in good 
governance literature to provide an alternative to head-on democratization and regime 
change. Transparency is easier to implement relative to full-scale democratization 
because it does not alter the balance of power in the host country or deprive the privileges 
of the elites. Primarily, transparency acts as a precipitator, which leads to better 
decisions, policies, and processes without causing a fundamental shift in the political 
 regime. In theory, it also facilitates “cooperation over opportunistic rent-seeking and help 
maintain norms of integrity and trust” (Kolstad & Wiig, 2009, p. 529). 
Despite its growing global appeal, it is actually difficult to find a common 
definition of transparency since it can apply to policy-making processes, policy 
outcomes, institutions, and various forms of information flows. In this research, I will use 
the categorization by Hollyer, Rosendorff and Vreeland (2014a) in order to meaningfully 
discuss different forms of transparency and their relative impact on corruption. They 
identify three aspects of transparency relevant to government policies. The first one is 
institutional transparency, which signifies the relative openness of government 
institutions and the policy-making processes. In other words, it concerns the amount of 
information citizens possess on the way governments carry out their policies. This aspect 
of transparency is often difficult to measure; yet it may be partially captured by indices of 
democracy (Broz, 2002), studies of central bank independence and freedom of 
information laws (Berliner, 2014; Chortareas, Stasavage, & Sterne, 2002; Islam, 2006), 
or in-depth case studies (Öge, 2014, 2015).  
The second aspect of transparency is media openness. A free and well-functioning 
media can both contribute to knowledge creation and disseminate existing information to 
a broader audience. This type of transparency is measured by freedom of the media 
indices (Brunetti & Weder, 2003). Finally, the third aspect of transparency is aggregate 
data disclosure by governments (Hollyer et al., 2014a). Data disclosure informs the 
general public on the broad policy outcomes that affect the welfare of the population as a 
whole. This type of data is crucial in order to assess government performance in key 
policy areas as economic growth, income inequality, etc.  
 How does transparency affect corruption? In extractive industries, corruption 
might take the form of bribes from foreign actors in exchange for preferential treatment 
(Franke, Gawrich, & Alakbarov, 2009, pp. 125-127), clandestine deals with private firms 
that are organically tied to the political leadership (Gleason, 2010, p. 78), illegal transfers 
from the national stability fund to private offshore accounts (Bohr, 2003; Esanov, Raiser, 
& Buiter, 2001, p. 5), nepotism in key bureaucratic positions (Peyrouse, 2012, p. 112), 
and payments to individuals or groups in exchange for their loyalty to the regime 
(Kalyuzhnova & Bluth, 2008, p. 55).  
Despite its evident qualities, the impact of transparency on corruption is not 
established, mostly due to problems of definition and measurement. Among different 
aspects of transparency mentioned above, institutional transparency is best equipped to 
address corruption and inefficiency in the extractive industries because it applies to how 
governments actually manage their natural resources. This form of transparency can 
undermine bribery and embezzlement in different stages of the resource management 
process by making such acts riskier, by providing good incentives to public officials, and 
by initiating a fair selection process for public servants. In contrast, a less transparent 
institutional environment would reduce scrutiny and removing incentives for reform. 
Islam, for example, shows that better access to government is correlated with higher 
governance levels (2006). Institutional transparency may also help democratization, by 
allowing the public to hold politicians accountable for their actions (Kolstad & Wiig, 
2009, p. 529).  
Transparency as media openness can also contribute to anti-corruption efforts by 
uncovering cases of misappropriation and nepotism. In fact, a negative correlation exists 
 between corruption and transparency when the latter is a measure of the freedom of press 
in a country (Brunetti & Weder, 2003). However, media is often constrained by its 
resources and ability to collect information (Hollyer et al., 2014a). This limitation is 
likely to manifest itself in extractive industries, which often operate in secrecy.  
Finally, transparency as disclosure of aggregate data is probably the least effective 
remedy to corruption compared to other forms of transparency. The form of transparency 
helps present an overall picture of the economy; however, the aggregate nature of the 
data makes it difficult to capture and prevent both micro and macro level instances of 
embezzlement. Fox (2007) demonstrates the contrast between institutional transparency 
and aggregate data disclosure, where the latter “does not reveal how institutions actually 
behave in practice, whether in terms of how they make decisions, or the result of their 
actions”. This opaque form of transparency, such as disclosing only aggregate data on 
resource revenues, is not an adequate method to curb corruption in extractive industries.  
Other attempts to measure the impact of transparency on governance assert that 
transparency’s positive effect on corruption is conditioned by specific factors, such as 
publicity, education and accountability (Kolstad & Wiig, 2009, p. 529). Transparency 
works to improve management of oil revenues when politicians are accountable and civil 
society groups can function as whistle blowers. If the information is not disseminated and 
civil society groups cannot operate, then transparency alone can not alleviate corruption 
(Lindstedt & Naurin, 2010). The implications of these studies challenge the work of 
transparency promoters in non-democratic settings, where there is limited political 
accountability and public awareness of government policies. The following section 
discusses transparency advocacy, focusing principally on the EITI process. 
 3. Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative and Corruption 
 
The revenues from hydrocarbons sometimes surge to very high levels, even as they tend 
to fluctuate over time. When not monitored carefully, people in positions of power are 
tempted to misuse these monies. Therefore, despite the alleged theoretical advantages of 
transparency for development, political elites in resource-rich countries may resist 
opening up their institutions and surrendering political control over the rents. In such 
settings, even reformist ministers may face difficulty in adopting economic policies that 
would harm the interests of few, concentrated beneficiaries. In addition, many resource-
rich developing countries might actually lack the mechanisms required to ensure resource 
revenue transparency (Atkinson & Hamilton, 2003).  
When there is limited domestic initiative and capacity for change, external 
influences, such as World Bank and International Monetary Fund, acquire significance in 
facilitating reforms. Developing energy-exporting states attract particular interest from 
these institutions due to their vital importance for the global economy. Transparency in 
natural resource revenues is also promoted by global advocacy groups, such as Revenue 
Watch and Publish What You Pay, as a measure to prevent corruption and 
mismanagement of revenues. External factors thus offer incentives and/or apply pressure 
to producer states to initiate governance reforms. In the last decade, the Extractive 
Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) has been the most successful among those 
influences (Del Castillo, 2009; Ernst, 2013) and it merits a detailed focus.  
The EITI is a coalition of countries, companies, and civil society groups that aims 
to establish global standards of transparency in extractive industries. The stakeholders of 
 the EITI include the governments of the United Kingdom, Germany, Qatar, the United 
States; companies such as the BP and ExxonMobil; and global advocacy networks such 
as Revenue Watch. The initiative also closely cooperates with the World Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund. The membership of the EITI increased very rapidly since it 
was launched in 2003, following the international support received from the United 
Kingdom and the World Bank. This is a major achievement for an international 
organization, which accepts members on a voluntary basis. As of November 2015, 49 
resource-rich countries implement the EITI standard and 31 countries are fully compliant 
to the initiative.1  
What kind of transparency does the EITI advocate? The complexity of the 
resource management process makes it difficult to define transparency in the extractive 
industries. Transparency in this sector may refer to the public availability of information 
on revenues, expenditures, awarding of contracts and licenses, public procurement, 
politicians’ personal wealth, appointments and promotions, clarity of roles and 
responsibilities, adequacy of internal and external accounting, auditing, and open budget 
processes (IMF, 2007; Kolstad & Wiig, 2009, p. 526). Despite this multifaceted nature of 
transparency in the extractive industries, the EITI’s initial approach to transparency 
focused only on government revenues from the sale of hydrocarbons and minerals. In that 
sense, the initiative originally adopted the third aspect of transparency - as aggregate data 
disclosure. 
                                                
1 EITI compliant countries as of November 2015: Albania, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Central African 
Republic, Chad, Côte d'Ivoire, Democratic Republic of Congo, Ghana, Guatemala, Guinea, Indonesia, Iraq, 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Mongolia, Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, 
Peru, Republic of the Congo, Sierra Leone, Tanzania, Timor-Leste, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Yemen, 
Zambia. 
 Accordingly, in the EITI model, participating oil, gas, and mining companies 
publish what they pay to the governments of their host countries, the governments 
publish what they receive. In this manner, the EITI process provides reliable information 
on resource revenues. A country becomes a candidate when the leader of the state makes 
a decisive declaration on country’s commitment, assigns an executive director to oversee 
the process, and establishes a multi-stakeholder group. This group includes designated 
representatives from the government, companies, and civil society groups (Eigen, 2006). 
Candidate status is only temporary and candidate countries have to start the validation 
process within two and a half years. The validation process is an “external, independent 
evaluation mechanism”, which determines whether or not a country met all the 
requirements to be compliant (EITI, 2013b). The requirements for compliance are 
effective oversight by the multi-stakeholder group, timely publication of comprehensive 
and easily accessible EITI reports that reveal government’s income from the extractive 
industries, and a credible assurance process. Once countries are validated, the EITI Board 
designates them the complaint status. The validation process continues after compliance 
and EITI complaint countries go through mandatory validation every three years. 
The proponents of the EITI share the implicit assumption that membership and 
compliance will lead to higher levels of transparency, which will eventually curb 
corruption. The official EITI view is that transparent revenues will instigate anti-
corruption reforms and improve trust and stability in the extractive industries (EITI, 
2014). The EITI directors are confident in their institution’s ability to enable other actors 
 (NGOs and independent researchers) to evaluate the validity of the published revenues 
and to observe whether or not these proceeds were well spent.2  
Before 2013 the EITI process focused almost exclusively on aggregate disclosure 
of government revenues and omitted institutional aspects of transparency such as signing 
of contracts with international oil companies, public expenditures, and investments for 
sustainable development. In response to an evaluation report in 2011, which underlined 
various problems with this approach (Scanteam, 2011), the EITI standard was revised in 
2013. The new EITI standard now includes additional disclosure requirements for state-
owned companies, transit payments, and social expenditures in addition to disaggregated 
reporting and improved auditing mechanisms. The new standard also encourages 
disclosure of production contracts though this is not a mandatory requirement to become 
compliant (EITI, 2013a). A full evaluation of the new standard would be premature at 
this moment. Nevertheless, the impact is likely to be positive because the changes 
underline a shift towards a more institutional understanding of transparency, which can 
better address corruption.  
A number of comparative studies on the EITI focus on the process itself and 
analyze how the initiative operates in different countries (Aaronson, 2011). Similarly, 
reports by international observers, such as Revenue Watch, point out to the challenges the 
initiative faces in broad terms, and provide suggestions on how the EITI should move 
beyond its mandate (Dykstra, 2011). These are also numerous case studies and reports 
that identify challenges the EITI faces in different political and social contexts (Keblusek, 
                                                
2 Interview with Dr. Francisco Paris, EITI Regional Director, 10 May 2011, Oslo. 
 
 2010). To the best of this author’s knowledge, only three studies systematically analyze 
the impact of EITI membership on transparency or corruption (Corrigan, 2014; David-
Barrett & Okamura, 2013; Ölcer, 2009). Ölcer (2009) finds that EITI membership does 
not have a significant impact on corruption levels. However, her research only focuses on 
the period between 2002 and 2007. Since almost all EITI-affiliated countries became 
candidates after 2007, the results are likely to be premature. Interestingly, two recent 
studies have conflicting results on the relationship between EITI membership and 
corruption. Based on panel data analysis, Corrigan (2014) finds that EITI membership 
does not improve corruption levels. In contrast, by using a matched pairs design, David-
Barrett and Okamura (2013) argue that corruption levels decline after EITI membership. 
Regardless of their conclusions, neither study offers a detailed theoretical explanation of 
why and how transparency is implemented in member countries. As many endorsers of 
the EITI assume that transparency and corruption are negatively correlated, it is crucial to 
analyze the theoretical implications of EITI compliance.  
4. Evaluating the pre-2013 EITI: Mock Compliance? 
 
The theoretical framework of the relationship between EITI membership, transparency, 
and corruption is best captured by the compliance literature, which explains how external 
influences may facilitate institutional changes. In many hydrocarbon-rich countries the 
state enjoys a financial autonomy from the societal forces. As a consequence, promoters 
of global norms focus their efforts on the political elite, which have the main authority to 
initiate reforms.  
 The compliance literature asserts that both material and ideational factors may 
contribute to leaders’ decisions to either comply or defect. These factors correspond to 
the logics of consequences and appropriateness respectively (March & Olsen, 1984). 
These two logics are not mutually exclusive and they may both have an impact on 
compliance during different stages of the process. However, given the strategic 
importance of natural resources, I expect the logic of consequences to be more relevant 
for the EITI process, especially in short and medium terms (Walter, 2008). In this logic, 
leaders evaluate immediate benefits and costs of carrying out transparency reforms and 
they comply with the demands of external transparency promoters when complying 
provides additional opportunities for the political elite to maintain their privileged status 
in an economy dominated by energy revenues. Ideational factors, which include social 
learning and internalization of norms by the help of epistemic communities (Finnemore 
& Sikkink, 1998; Haas, 1992), are also essential; yet they are more likely to be effective 
in a substantially longer time frame (Walter, 2008, p. 35).   
I expect, then, the leaders to be more open to transparency in extractive industries 
when the benefits of compliance outweigh the costs. Yet, these cost-benefit calculations 
may be complicated by many factors. Especially when the external pressure for reform is 
strong and the costs of compliance are high, countries might be tempted to seek 
alternatives to full compliance. One such alternative is mock compliance, which is a term 
coined by Andrew Walter in response to various financial reforms adopted by countries 
in East Asia (2008). Mock compliance is a rational process, which attempts to appease 
international audience by mimicking compliance to global norms. It combines the 
 “rhetoric and outward appearance of compliance with international standards together 
with relatively hidden behavioral divergence from such standards” (Walter, 2008, p. 5).  
Mock compliance underlines a decoupling, which explains the gap between 
institutionalized policies and substantive outcomes (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). At the 
international level, decoupling often occurs in response to external pressures, which 
demand compliance with regulations and norms on good governance (Tilcsik, 2010, p. 
1474). States that are eager to signal compliance, albeit only symbolically, sign on to 
initiatives without necessarily changing their actual policy practices. Therefore, 
decoupling helps countries to gain legitimacy while maintaining the internal flexibility to 
pursue their goals (Meyer & Rowan, 1977).  
Mock compliance is a compromise for many governments, who are not willing to 
fully implement certain best practices promoted by IFIs and global advocacy networks. 
Andrew Walter states three conditions for mock compliance strategies to be viable: high 
costs of private sector compliance, high costs of noncompliance, and high costs of third 
party compliance monitoring (2008, p. 36). Compliance to the norm of transparency in 
resource management satisfies all three criteria. Firstly, for many resource-rich countries, 
embedded interests in the extractive industries and clientelism present a major domestic 
obstacle to transparency and anti-corruption reforms. Complete institutional transparency 
and free media may reveal severe mismanagement of revenues and corruption in 
extractive industries (Mehlum et al., 2008). As a consequence, the costs of making 
resource management entirely transparent would be too high for those who benefit the 
most from secret financial transactions, bribes, embezzlement, etc.  
 Secondly, it is evident that transparency has become a globally accepted norm 
with the EITI being the main promoter of this norm in the extractive industries. 
Substantial material benefits and reputational gains associated with compliance can make 
the costs of shunning the EITI too high for resource-rich countries. What are the 
immediate benefits of compliance? In theory, implementing transparency in the resource 
sector signals a political will to embrace open markets and good governance, which could 
lead to substantial benefits for non-hegemonic countries by improving their 
creditworthiness in the realm of global finance (Simmons, 2001; Walter, 2008, p. 39). In 
addition, a potential benefit of adopting transparency in the management of natural 
resources is the increased likelihood of attracting foreign investment in the extractive 
industries. Globalization of capital demands that countries compete with each other in 
order to host foreign investment. For countries that rely on extractive industries to earn 
foreign exchange, this competition to attract foreign direct investment (FDI) is especially 
important because resource sectors often require long-term, capital-intensive investments 
from multinational companies to maintain production levels (De Soysa & Oneal, 1999). 
In this context, the competition to lure and maintain FDI, especially from industrialized 
democracies, increases leadership incentives to adopt norms such as transparency 
(Henisz, 2002; Walter, 2008, p. 40).  
Finally, third party costs of monitoring of transparency and corruption in all 
stages of resource management are quite high due to the complexity of the value chain in 
extractive industries. In addition, the EITI relies on mechanisms that function well in 
industrialized democracies, yet may be problematic for many developing countries. For 
instance, the EITI model requires that civil society have capacity and freedom to raise 
 concerns about the process and act as whistle blowers. Furthermore, it demands an 
institutional system, which would allow politicians and firms to be accountable for any 
discrepancies discovered. 3  However, in many resource-rich states civil societies are 
financially weak and they lack the capacity to monitor revenues. Furthermore, especially 
in authoritarian countries, NGOs are unable to hold politicians or businesses accountable 
for corruption or mismanagement of revenues.  
In light of these considerations, it is clear that the pre-2013 EITI experience 
carried all the pre-conditions of mock compliance, especially given the fact that the 
ultimate aim of these efforts was to curb corruption and mismanagement. While the EITI 
members did not directly deceive the global community, the narrow vision of 
transparency they adopted caused a major decoupling of institutionalized policies and 
substantive outcomes. Before 2013, the EITI process focused mostly on aggregate data 
on revenues, which was fairly limited given the whole range of economic activities 
associated with resource management. This was a snapshot picture, attacking only the 
middle of the value chain.4 This narrow interpretation was relatively easier to implement 
since it did not threaten patronage relations, ownership systems, and off-the-books 
corruption at the highest levels. It could also bring major financial benefits to the 
implementing countries without any significant political costs. In these circumstances, 
political leadership encouraged transparency reforms to the extent necessary to gain 
favorable international publicity and investment flows. 
                                                
3 Interview with Dr. Francisco Paris, EITI Regional Director, 10 May 2011, Oslo. 
4 Interview with Dr. Francisco Paris, EITI Regional Director, 10 May 2011, Oslo. 
 
 Revenue transparency by itself is a novel endeavor to pursue for resource-rich 
countries and it is likely to make a positive impact on overall governance. Yet, the 
effectiveness of this method for curbing corruption is questionable. As mentioned in the 
previous sections, corruption can take place in various stages of the resource management 
process. The evidence from resource-rich countries shows that corrupt practices may 
occur as early as the negotiations and the contract phase, which is not covered by the 
EITI process (Kolstad & Wiig, 2009, p. 528). For example, the EITI may publish that a 
mining company in Lima is paying 3.7 billion dollars for royalties, but “it does not say 
anything because we do not know if this is what they are supposed to pay.” 5 In fact, 
without the contracts and the books of the company, there is no process to establish the 
exact debt. Besides contracts, corruption is also very likely to happen at the spending 
stage. Public expenditures have a crucial role in sustaining patronage politics in resource-
rich countries and again this was not in the agenda of the original EITI standard (Kolstad 
& Wiig, 2009, p. 529; Öge, 2014). This set-up encouraged member governments to 
embrace the EITI without any clear intention to tackle corruption. For this reason, despite 
the popularity and the apparent success of transparency efforts associated with the EITI, I 
do not anticipate a positive change in perceptions of corruption in the period between 
2006 and 2013. 
 
 
                                                
5 Interview with Dr. Francisco Paris, EITI Regional Director, 10 May 2011, Oslo. 
 
 5. Interrupted Time Series Design 
 
This paper problematizes the basic premise of the EITI process prior to 2013, which 
implicitly assumed that the initiative would increase overall transparency and this would 
eventually phase out corruption. As mentioned above, the literature on transparency is 
unable to provide a definite answer on its alleged positive impact on corruption. It is 
shown that transparency is more likely to contribute to better governance when it is 
coupled with mechanisms of free speech and political accountability. However, it is not 
clear whether it can fulfill this goal in non-democratic environments. Furthermore, 
despite the expectations of EITI supporters, so far there is no empirical evidence to 
demonstrate that visibility of resource revenues is positively correlated with overall 
transparency and negatively correlated with corruption. In fact, studies demonstrate that 
some early adopters of EITI have seen their corruption levels deteriorate over the years 
(Öge, 2014).  
To evaluate how EITI membership affected transparency and perceptions of 
corruption before 2013, I use an interrupted time-series (ITS) design, which can analyze 
the causal impact of an intervention (Lewis-Beck & Alford, 1980; Linden, 2015). The 
analysis compares observations on either side of a cut-off point in order to detect any 
apparent changes in the dependent variable initiated by the intervention. In this case, the 
cut-off point is the first year of EITI membership. However, since the actual year of 
membership varies for each country it would be difficult to test the impact of EITI on 
transparency and corruption across cases. To resolve this issue, I create the variable, 
TIME, which is a running count of integers. The variable takes the value “1” the year a 
 country becomes a member and increases by one every year. The count also goes 
backwards in order to capture trends in transparency and corruption before membership. 
For all countries the value of TIME the year before membership would be “0”, two years 
before membership would be “-1”, etc. Table 1 illustrates the changing values of TIME 
for three EITI members. Accordingly, Azerbaijan became an EITI candidate and member 
in 2007, Indonesia in 2010, and Zambia in 2009. Defined as such, TIME allows us to 
observe any significant changes in governance trends, or interruptions, in countries 
before and after EITI membership.  
 
Table 1 Values of TIME for selected EITI members 
Country	 2006	 2007	 2008	 2009	 2010	 2011	 2012	 2013	
Azerbaijan	 0	 1	 2	 3	 4	 5	 6	 7	
Indonesia	 -3	 -2	 -1	 0	 1	 2	 3	 4	
Zambia	 -2	 -1	 0	 1	 2	 3	 4	 5	
 
 
The first analysis focuses on the impact of EITI membership on transparency 
levels. As mentioned in the literature review, it is difficult to find an indicator for 
transparency that can capture its different aspects. However, since the pre-2013 EITI 
focused exclusively on aggregate data disclosure, we can narrow our treatment of 
transparency accordingly here. To measure this aspect of transparency, this research uses 
the HRV index, which looks at collection and dissemination of data by governments. 
Specifically, using a Bayesian Item Response Theory, the HRV index focuses on 
governments’ reporting of credible aggregate economic data to World Bank’s World 
 Development Indicators. The index covers 125 countries from 1980 to 2010 and analyzes 
240 economic variables including production and trade in extractive industries. The Item 
Response Method examines missing data among these variables and treats transparency 
as a latent term, which highlights governments’ tendencies to disclose. Overall, 
governments that provide more data are likely to have higher HRV scores. However, this 
method also allows different weights for different types of data reported based on “how 
many other countries actually reported data on the measure, and how much a country 
distinguishes itself from other countries by reporting data on a given measure” (Hollyer 
et al., 2014a). 
The HRV index captures a reliable and an objective measure of a government’s 
capacity and intent to disclose even if it does not quite capture institutional and media 
related aspects of transparency. Another major advantage of this index is that unlike 
many indices of governance it is not based on subjective views of experts, but rather on 
objective criteria. Even though the index is relatively new, it has already featured in 
several works in the literature as a measure of economic transparency (Graham, Johnston, 
& Kingsley, 2015; Hollyer, Rosendorff, & Vreeland, 2014b, 2015; Michener, 2015; 
Rosendorff & Shin, 2012) and inspired more specialized indexes (Copelovitch, Gandrud, 
& Hallerberg, 2015; Williams, 2015). This present research will be the first to use the 
HRV index in order to measure the impact of EITI membership on overall transparency 
levels.   
As the last available year of the HRV index is 2010, the analysis here does not 
include countries that joined the EITI after 2010. The regression equation for this ITS is 
expressed as follows (Linden & Adams, 2011; Simonton, 1977):  
 Transparencyt = β0 + β1 TIMEt + β2 MEMBERt + β3 TIMEt MEMBERt + εt 
 Transparency is the dependent variable, which is indicated by the HRV index. 
TIME is a running count of integers as explained above. MEMBER is a dummy variable, 
which takes the value 1 if a country is an EITI member in a given year and 0 if a country 
is not yet a member. The model also includes an interaction of TIME and MEMBER. The 
coefficient for MEMBER (β2) indicates change in transparency levels immediately after 
the intervention. The coefficient of the interaction variable (β3) represents the difference 
in the slope of the outcome variable before and after the intervention, hence reflects 
longer-term trends. Table 2 shows the outcome of the OLS-regression based on the ITS 
model. The results show that all variables are actually significant. EITI membership has 
an immediate positive impact on transparency. Furthermore, the slopes of outcome 
variable over time are significantly different before and after membership. These results 
imply that candidacy and membership to the EITI actually improves overall transparency 
defined as disclosure of aggregate economic data. Finally, the negative value of TIME 
shows that there is a declining trend in transparency levels among EITI countries. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Table 2 – Interrupted Time Series Analysis –EITI Membership and Transparency 
Variable	 			
	 	
TIME	 -0.294***	
	 (-8.52)				
	 	
MEMBER	 0.223*			
	 (-2.09)	
	 	
INTERACTION	 0.128*			
	 (-2.49)	
	 	
_cons	 0.204	
	 -0.77	
	 	
N	 170	
 
t statistics in parentheses 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
 
The graphical presentation is often best way to show whether or not a 
discontinuity exists at the cutoff point. Accordingly, Figure 1 demonstrates the 
relationship between the outcome and the rating variable for all EITI members with the 
cut-off point marked as the year of membership. The variable of TIME allows us to 
visualize the impacts of EITI affiliation for all these countries as if they all became 
members in the same year. The graph shows that the EITI membership moderates the 
overall negative trend in transparency levels.  
  
Figure 1 - Impact of EITI on Transparency Levels 
Data Source: (Hollyer et al., 2014a) 
 
Normally, a control group of non-EITI members could be used to provide 
additional validity to the analysis above. However, since membership date among EITI 
countries is not uniform, including a control group of non-EITI members in the 
regression analysis is not possible. Instead, the Figure 2 shows the HRV index in 43 non-
EITI resource-rich countries between 2006 and 2010. The graph shows that transparency 
levels also declined for this group during this period and there was not an apparent 
external shock.   
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Figure 2  - Transparency Levels in Non-EITI Resource-Rich Countries 
 
Data Source: (Hollyer et al., 2014a) 
 
The second analysis measures the impact of EITI membership on perceptions of 
corruption. The universe of cases includes EITI members as of September 2013. The time 
frame is set between 2006 and 2013 and captures the membership dates of all current 
EITI members except Myanmar, Seychelles, the United Kingdom, the United States and 
Papua New Guinea, which became members in 2014. The dependent variable is control 
of corruption (World Bank, 2013), a continuous index from -2.5 to 2.5 with higher scores 
associated with lower levels of corruption. The index is based on surveys of experts and 
entrepreneurs, which comment on the nature of transactions between individuals, 
governments, and businesses. As a composite index, control of corruption is subject to 
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 various criticisms such as lack of comparability over time and space, or embedded hidden 
biases from the perspective of business elites. Yet, in the absence of a better alternative, 
this index serves as one of the best indicators of corruption in the governance literature 
(Kaufmann, Kraay, & Mastruzzi, 2007).  
The index does not measure corruption specific to the extractive industries; 
unfortunately, this type of quantitative data does not exist. Nevertheless, in many EITI 
countries, foreign experts and entrepreneurs that complete corruption surveys almost 
exclusively operate in these industries. Furthermore, as a recent OECD report suggests, 
the extractive industries has more foreign bribery cases than any other sector (OECD, 
2014). The resource sector is more susceptible to corruption since it generates substantial 
amounts of revenues in short periods of time, which can easily be channeled to third 
parties. For these reasons, it is quite likely that for many resource-rich countries, 
corruption in the extractive industries would be the most important determinant of this 
index. In other words, the respondents’ perceptions of corruption would largely reflect 
corruption levels in the extractive industries. Finally, the above analysis reveals that 
EITI’s positive impact on transparency is not exclusive to the extractive industries. EITI 
membership has an immediate impact on overall aggregate data disclosure. Hence, 
measuring its impact on general perceptions of corruption would not be a huge leap. The 
regression equation for this ITS is as follows: 
CORt =  β0 +  β1 TIMEt +  β2 MEMBERt +  β3 TIMEt MEMBERt + εt 
Table 3 shows the outcome of the OLS-regression based on the ITS model. As 
expected, none of the variables are significant, which implies that EITI candidacy does 
 not have a distinct impact on corruption levels. The results do not change when an 
alternative indicator of corruption from the International Country Risk Guide is used 
(PRS, 2014).  
Table 3 – Interrupted Time Series Analysis – EITI Membership and Corruption  
Variable	 			
	 	
TIME	 -0.00728	
	 (-1.12)				
	 	
MEMBER	 0.0551	
	 -0.7	
	 	
INTERACTION	 -0.00163	
	 (-0.22)				
	 	
_cons	 -0.665***	
	 (-6.43)				
	 	
N	 345	
 
t statistics in parentheses 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
 
A potential concern with this result is that EITI membership, or candidacy, does 
not necessarily signify full compliance. In fact, many members become fully compliant 
only two years after having become candidates. To address this issue, the regression 
equation in Table 4 replaces the variable MEMBER with COMPLIANT, which is a lagged 
measure of membership by two years. The results, however, are very similar. Full 
compliance to the initiative in this period does not seem to have an impact on perceptions 
of corruption. 
 Table 4 – Interrupted Time Series Analysis – EITI Compliance and Corruption 
Variable	 			
	 	
TIME	 -0.000554	
	 (-0.12)				
	 	
MEMBER	 0.0925	
	 (-0.76)	
	 	
INTERACTION	 -0.00743	
	 (-0.83)				
	 	
_cons	 -0.715***	
	 (-7.34)				
	 	
N	 345	
 
t statistics in parentheses 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
 
The graph in Figure 3 demonstrates the relationship between corruption and TIME 
for all EITI members with two cut-off points: first and third years of membership. The 
regression analysis and the graph confirm the initial hypothesis of the paper regarding 
EITI membership and corruption in this period. Compliance to the pre-2013 standard 
does not affect perceptions of corruption. In addition, we can see that almost all EITI 
members have already high corruption levels, except for Norway, which is the outlier at 
the top.  
  
Figure 3 – Impact of EITI Membership on Corruption Levels 
Data Source: World Bank (2013) Worldwide Governance Indicators 
 
 
Finally, Figure 4 shows corruption levels in 43 non-EITI resource-rich countries 
during the same time period. Trends in corruption levels in this control group do not 
show any divergence from those of EITI members. Furthermore, the figure reveals that 
there was no major external shock in this period that could have distorted the results.   
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Figure 4 – Corruption Levels in 43 Non-EITI Resource-Rich Countries 
Data Source: World Bank (2013) Worldwide Governance Indicators 
 
6. Panel Data Analysis and Results 
 
In addition to the ITS model above, a panel data analysis can offer a comprehensive 
method of understanding medium-term trends in transparency and corruption levels. The 
analysis focuses on the relationship between EITI membership, transparency and 
perception of corruption, and it provides additional verification of the results in the 
previous section. The first analysis focuses on the impact of EITI membership on the 
HRV index. Hence, transparency is the dependent variable and the annual data covers the 
period from when countries officially began to be accepted as EITI candidates up to 
2010, the last available year for the HRV index.  
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 The main independent variable is EITI membership. EITI is a dichotomous 
variable, which takes the values 0 and 1 based on country’s membership status with the 
initiative. The variable YEAR is included in the model as an explanatory variable to 
control for any existing trends in transparency levels, which are independent of EITI 
membership. I also introduce two other variables as potential determinants of 
transparency. Firstly, transparency and corruption in the extractive industries are closely 
related to the functioning of national bureaucracies (Brunetti & Weder, 2003). Therefore, 
I use the index of Bureaucratic Quality from International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) as 
an explanatory variable, which runs from 0 to 4. Another potential key variable is the 
level of democracy (Brunetti & Weder, 2003; Lindstedt & Naurin, 2010). I expect higher 
levels of democracy to be correlated with higher levels of transparency and lower levels 
of corruption thanks to higher political accountability and public monitoring of finances. 
I use the Polity IV dataset to measure democracy, which runs from -10 to 10, with higher 
values associated with more democratic institutions. Finally I also use logged GDP per 
capita (World Bank, 2014) and the Freedom of the Press index by the Freedom House 
(2015) as additional controls.  
Since the main purpose of the research is to analyze the impact of variables over 
time, I carry out a panel data analysis with fixed effects. The fixed-effects model includes 
country dummies; hence it controls for any time-invariant country characteristics that 
affect the dependent variable and allows one to assess the net effect of independent 
variables, which all have 1-year lags, except YEAR. The first model can be specified as 
follows: 
Transparencyit = β1YEARi(t) + β2EITIi(t-1) + β3 BURi(t-1) + β4 POLi(t-1) + αi + υit 
 Table 5 shows the results of the series of panel data regressions with fixed effects. 
The standard error estimates are corrected to be robust to disturbances being 
heteroscedastic. The case selection includes both the universal set of countries (columns 
1-2) and those that are considered as resource-rich (columns 3-4). The comprehensive list 
of all hydrocarbon and mineral-rich countries include 85 countries identified by IMF, 
Revenue Watch and the EITI (EITI, 2012; IMF, 2010; Revenue Watch, 2013). 
 
Table 5 – Panel Data Analysis – EITI Membership and Transparency 
 
Variable	 (1)	All	 (2)	All	 (3)	Res	 (4)	Res	
	 	 	 	 	
YEAR	 -0.378***	 -0.466***	 -0.336***	 -0.399***	
	 (-11.40)	 (-10.27)	 (-6.72)	 (-6.03)				
	 	 	 	 	
EITI	 0.541***	 0.543***	 0.451**	 0.474***	
	 (-4.44)	 (-4.92)	 (-3.07)	 (-3.48)	
	 	 	 	 	
BUR	 0.746**	 0.749***	 0.475*	 0.562***	
	 (-3.29)	 (-4.04)	 (-2.2)	 (-3.52)	
	 	 	 	 	
POL	 0.00701***	 -0.0107	 0.00653***	 0.00889	
	 (-4.89)	 (-0.48)	 (-5.31)	 (-0.36)	
	 	 	 	 	
GDPpc	 	 1.338	 	 0.512	
	 	 (-1.22)	 	 (-0.42)	
	 	 	 	 	
FOTP	 	 -0.019	 	 -0.0245	
	 	 (-1.80)	 	 (-1.77)				
	 	 	 	 	
CONS	 758.8***	 924.9***	 675.3***	 798.5***	
	 (-11.44)	 (-10.7)	 (-6.74)	 (-6.21)	
	 	 	 	 	
N	 555	 425	 305	 240	
 
t statistics in parentheses 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
 The results reveal that the EITI membership has a significant and positive impact 
on the HRV index in all variations of the model. This outcome once again confirms that 
EITI’s efforts to make resource revenues more visible actually transcends to other areas 
of economic transparency. The negative and significant coefficient of YEAR underlines 
the declining trend in the index, which was also already captured by the ITS analysis. 
Bureaucratic quality has a significant, positive impact on transparency in all the models, 
whereas the positive impact of democracy ceases to be significant when control variables 
are introduced. Yet these control variables do not significantly affect transparency levels.  
The second panel data analysis focuses on EITI’s impact on perceptions of 
corruption. The only difference from the model above is the dependent variable, which is 
now control of corruption (2013). For this analysis, annual data covers the period from 
when countries officially began to be accepted as EITI candidates (2006) up to 2013. The 
regression model can be specified as follows: 
CORit = β1YEARi(t) + β2EITIi(t-1) + β3 BURi(t-1) + β4 POLi(t-1) + αi + υit 
Table 6 shows that the binary EITI variable is not significant in any of the models, 
once again confirming that EITI membership in this period did not improve perceptions 
of corruption. YEAR is significant and negative in the first two columns, which highlights 
the increasing global trend in corruption levels over the years; however, the regression 
coefficient is very small and this effect disappears when non-resource rich countries are 
dropped from the analysis. The results also confirm the predictions of the literature on the 
main causes of corruption. BUR has the expected sign and significant. POL is also 
significant and positive in all models.  
 Table 6 - Panel Data Analysis – EITI Membership and Corruption 
Variable	 (1)	All	 (2)	All	 (3)	Res	 (4)	Res	
	 	 	 	 	
YEAR	 -0.00735*	 -0.0104*	 -0.00991	 -0.0117	
	 (-2.01)	 (-2.13)	 (-1.99)	 (-1.67)				
	 	 	 	 	
EITI	 -0.0143	 -0.0196	 -0.0109	 -0.0176	
	 (-0.57)	 (-0.78)	 (-0.42)	 (-0.68)				
	 	 	 	 	
BUR	 0.108*	 0.121**	 0.121**	 0.104*			
	 (-2.37)	 (-2.76)	 (-2.66)	 (-2.2)	
	 	 	 	 	
POL	 0.00151**	 0.00132*	 0.00223**	 0.00292***	
	 (-3.05)	 (-2.18)	 (-3.26)	 (-5.82)	
	 	 	 	 	
GDPpc	 	 0.0905	 	 0.0519	
	 	 (-0.83)	 	 (-0.36)	
	 	 	 	 	
FOTP	 	 -0.00289*	 	 -0.00262	
	 	 (-2.11)	 	 (-1.64)				
	 	 	 	 	
CONS	 14.45	 19.89*	 19.33	 22.79	
	 (-1.97)	 (-2.17)	 (-1.93)	 (-1.72)	
	 	 	 	 	
N	 929	 749	 490	 404	
 
t statistics in parentheses 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
 
7. Discussion and Implications 
 
This research makes an original contribution to show that the EITI process actually leads 
to more economic transparency in all sectors. However, the results also underline that 
pre-2013 EITI membership did not have a significant impact on corruption. More 
precisely, the ITS design and the panel data analysis reveal no discernable change in 
perceptions of corruption following EITI membership. This outcome contradicts the 
 results of a recent study by David-Barrett and Okamura (2013), who claim that EITI 
members observe a decline in their corruption levels. In the period before 2013, while 
overall aggregate economic data disclosure increased, critical data on resource 
management that relates to contracts and spending remained hidden, leaving many 
corruption networks intact. 
An alternative explanation for the endurance of corruption could be that the EITI 
process is still relatively young and institutions are sticky. It is true that institutional 
reforms towards better governance may require prolonged periods of adjustment and 
some members might need additional time to fully reap the alleged benefits of the EITI 
standard. In other words, even the pre-2013 EITI process might lead to more concrete 
outcomes as institutions of member countries slowly adapt to new standards of 
transparency and the political elite internalizes the norm. However, this is certainly a 
longer-term process than the period defined in this paper. Actually, numerous longer-
term members of the EITI, such as Timor-Leste, Azerbaijan, the Republic of Congo, 
Mali, and Yemen, have actually seen their corruption levels worsen over the last five 
years (World Bank, 2013). 
For the future of transparency promotion and corruption in the extractive 
industries, the revised EITI standard is certainly a step in the right direction. As 
mentioned before, the 2013 Standard includes institutional aspects of transparency, which 
are more likely to confront corruption. To further tackle corruption in extractive 
industries, governments, civil society groups and businesses could push the current EITI 
framework to adopt more oversight mechanisms from the parliaments and independent 
auditing bodies (Dykstra, 2011). This is not an easy task. Many members, such as 
 Azerbaijan, are ready to embrace the EITI as long as the process does not alter the 
distribution of political and economic power in the country. Once a champion of revenue 
transparency, Baku is finding it increasingly difficult to accommodate civil society input 
and to comply with the new EITI standards after 2013 (Lomsadze, 2015). In various 
candidate and compliant countries, the non-governmental organizations are not treated as 
equal partners and their concerns regarding the process are not adequately taken into 
account (Öge, 2014). Furthermore, the lack of public awareness and problems of 
accessibility prevent spillovers to other aspects of governance. The EITI is successful in 
making revenues more transparent and this impact transcends to other areas of the 
economy; however, the main problems that are related to the functioning of the 
bureaucracies and democratization are clearly beyond the mandate of the initiative.  
The results have broad implications for the compliance literature. Mock 
compliance, or decoupling is not unique to the EITI process. This phenomenon is 
common in international initiatives that attempt to improve existing practices in 
developing countries. When norms become global and non-compliance becomes too 
costly, countries often prefer this second-best option (Walter, 2008). For example Hafner-
Burton and Tsutsui (2005) demonstrate how states use international human right treaties 
as window dressing while actual practices may continue to deteriorate. Similarly, national 
environmental policies often decouple from those of global environmental regimes 
(Schofer & Hironaka, 2005). Other instances of mock compliance are very blatant. For 
instance, the decision to invite foreign election observers became a global norm to signal 
democratization in the last decade. As a consequence, foreign observers monitor almost 
80 percent of all national elections, “but puzzlingly, many leaders invite foreign 
 observers and orchestrate electoral fraud in front of them” (Hyde, 2011, p. 356). The 
increasing presence of mock compliance in international treaties and agreements could 
seriously undermine the efforts to improve governance in developing countries. Hence, 
further research on the causes and consequences of mock compliance and decoupling is 
needed.  
A second major implication of the results is the importance of democracies in 
alleviating corruption. As already implicated in the literature on corruption, political 
accountability and citizen’s participation in policy making are key factors in preventing 
corruption. These aspects of democracies are also likely to improve public monitoring of 
resource management and limit wasteful spending. In the long run, if and when autocratic 
resource-rich countries eventually democratize, the already existence of EITI methods 
could give them a head start to finally address corruption in their extractive industries.  
The results also have important policy implications. Transparency promotion as a 
policy towards developing countries is supported by many industrial states and 
international organizations. It is often perceived as a key first step towards good 
governance in resource-rich developing countries. However, if transparency as aggregate 
data disclosure has no significant effect on corruption, is it still a worthwhile mission? 
The results suggest that a more comprehensive treatment of transparency that includes its 
institutional and media-related aspects might be necessary; specifically to distinguish 
regimes that use transparency reforms for public relations purposes as opposed to genuine 
reformers.  
 
 8. Conclusion 
 
The analysis in this paper shows that association with the EITI between 2006 and 2013 
increased overall economic transparency, yet it did not have an impact on perceptions of 
corruption. While this outcome may seem counterintuitive to many transparency 
advocates and supporters of the initiative, it is not surprising. Tackling corruption is not 
an easy task, especially given embedded interests in the production and exportation of 
natural resources and the complexity of the resource value chain. The lingering 
corruption in many member states does not suggest that the pre-2013 EITI process was a 
failure. Though it was not a remedy for corruption, increase in aggregate data 
transparency in this period provided better information to the general public about the 
state of the economy, which directly concerns their welfare.      
If disclosing revenues is not a practical solution to corruption, what are some 
viable alternative policies for resource-rich countries? The results suggest that countries 
would have to improve bureaucratic efficiency and democratic accountability in order to 
effectively reduce corruption levels. In numerous developing resource-rich countries, 
national bureaucracies control the resource extraction and management processes through 
various forms of state-owned companies and sovereign wealth funds. The lack of 
oversight mechanisms permits unmonitored transfer of funds to accounts and ventures 
confirmed by the political leadership, which is likely to facilitate corruption. Holding 
these national bureaucracies on the extractive industries to higher standards of corporate 
conduct and improving how they are governed could help restrain the rentier mentality 
and control corruption.  
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